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A LIBERAL THEORY OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR
CHILDREN
COLIN M. MACLEOD*

INTRODUCTION

A conspicuous feature of much contemporary liberal political
philosophy is the absence of sustained discussion of how basic liberal
ideals of justice, equality, liberty, and rights apply to children. This is
a serious oversight. But neglect of the status of children is not peculiar to contemporary liberalism. Conservative, communitarian, and
even feminist theory has not, for the most part, grappled seriously
with the challenges of incorporating the distinctive needs and interests of children in an account of political philosophy. Some critics of
liberal philosophy suspect that liberalism, with its traditional focus on
individual rights and respect for autonomy, is especially inhospitable
to accommodating the needs of children.
Amitai Etzioni shares this suspicion. His interesting and engaging essay, On Protecting Childrenfrom Speech,1 explores one area in
which traditional liberal doctrines might seem particularly vulnerable
to criticism. Etzioni seeks to identify principles for the interpretation
of freedom of speech that can appropriately accommodate the interests of children. The communitarian approach he presents seeks to
achieve a balance between the free-speech rights of adults and the
claims of vulnerable children to be protected from exposure to harmful cultural materials. It appeals to a context-sensitive politics of the
common good in which individual rights can be limited for the sake of
other values, especially the value of protecting children from harm.
According to Etzioni, a communitarian approach provides a muchneeded salve to an excessive form of individualism rampant in politi* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Victoria; author of
LIBERALISM, JUSTICE, AND MARKETS: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL EQUALITY (1998) and co-

editor with David Archard of THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN (2002). I
would like to thank Avigail Eisenberg, Amitai Etzioni, Mark Gammon, and Alistair Macleod
for helpful feedback.
1. Amitai Etzioni, On ProtectingChildrenfrom Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (2004).
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cal culture that has spawned a conception of liberal rights that is hostile to the common good. In particular, overemphasis in law and politics on the protection of individual rights has encumbered the
reasonable efforts of parents and local communities to protect children. Etzioni's proposed communitarian corrective is aimed at empowering parents and local communities to address the corrosion to
the common good allegedly caused by liberal rights.
Evidence of the harm posed to children by various forms of constitutionally protected kinds of speech provides a justification for
various legislative measures that limit the access minors can have to
such expression and provide parents with resources (e.g., labeling, Vchip technology) that can help them monitor and regulate the materials consumed by their children. This paper offers a liberal rejoinder to
Etzioni's analysis. But we should distinguish two questions about the
difference between liberal and communitarian views. First, must liberals be hostile to the political proposals made by Etzioni concerning
the appropriate resolution of the various specific controversies he
explores? Second, is Etzioni's communitarian approach to freespeech issues involving children preferable to an analysis grounded in
liberal ideals of equality, individualism, and rights?
The answer to both questions is no. At the policy level, there is
common ground between liberals and Etzioni. Liberals need not, and
indeed should not, embrace the extreme libertarian stance on freedom of speech presented by some representatives of the ACLU with
respect to free-speech issues implicating children. Specifically, liberals
can endorse a "child-adult separation approach" in order to limit access that children have to the Internet on computers placed in public
libraries. Liberals can endorse mandatory labeling and rating systems
as well as V-chip technology and other strategies that are designed to
alert parents about potentially objectionable materials directed towards children. And liberals can accept strong regulations on commercial speech directed towards children. These policy options are
attractive from a liberal point of view because they afford a way of
protecting children without emasculating the legitimate free-speech
rights of adults. The points of disagreement between Etzioni and myself are not, therefore, to be located primarily at the policy level, at
least with respect to the particular issues he canvases. Instead, I dispute Etzioni's assessment of the relative merits of communitarian and
liberal approaches to freedom of speech issues concerning children. A
suitably developed liberal theory of freedom of expression can dis-
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play sensitivity to the distinct and important interests of children in a
way that exposes some important limitations of Etzioni's communitarian position.
The main points of contrast between Etzioni's analysis and the
liberal theory developed here concern the interpretation of children's
interests and the standing of children as individuals in society. Etzioni's analysis focuses mainly on the special vulnerability of children
and on the importance of preventing children from being exposed to
potentially harmful cultural materials. He is reticent, consequently,
about attributing significant free-speech rights to children, even teenagers, and he is sympathetic to limiting the free-speech rights of
adults in order to protect the welfare of children. Liberals accept that
children need to be insulated from exposure to some forms of expression, but children's interests are more complex than the narrow focus
on prevention of harm suggests. On the liberal view I defend, children
have special evolving interests that are rooted in a particular conception of moral personality. The claim each child has to develop and
exercise the moral powers that ultimately shape each person's distinct
and independent moral personality gives rise to interests that children
have, qua children, to information and to conditions conducive to
independent reflection and deliberation. In virtue of such interests,
children can acquire, well before they become adults, nontrivial rights
of free expression. Respecting children's rights to free expression can
entail limits on the prerogatives of parents to determine the sorts of
cultural materials to which children should be permitted to access.
Determining how considerations of parental authority, promotion of
children's welfare, children's rights of free expression, and the rights
of adults to free expression are to be coherently integrated poses difficult challenges. The objective of this paper is to outline a recognizably liberal theory of freedom of expression that meets these
challenges. Towards that end, I begin by identifying some characteristic features of contemporary liberal approaches to freedom of expression. I will then explain how the liberal framework interprets and
accommodates the distinct interests of children concerning free expression.
I.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERESTS OF FREE AND
EQUAL PERSONS

A philosophical theory of freedom of expression seeks to provide
an explanation of the value of freedom of expression and an account
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of the considerations that justify limits on free expression.2 Defenders
of strong rights to freedom of expression, those who might be termed
"freedom of expression absolutists," sometimes present their position
as if there are literally no justifiable limits on free expression, or at
least on free speech. Such a position may have some rhetorical appeal
in political battles waged over erosion of First Amendment protections threatened by censorious governments. However, the position
has no philosophical credibility, and it is alien to the tradition of liberal political philosophy.3 Liberals, along with communitarians, endorse various "time, place, and manner" regulations of free
expression. Moreover, some content-based regulations of free expression are uncontroversial. For instance, persons are not at liberty to
express defamatory remarks that are false and calculated to cause
harm to those they defame. Harm, nuisance, and offense are grounds
on which speech can be regulated. We cannot find a helpful contrast
between liberals and communitarians by attributing to liberals the
simplistic view that free-speech rights of adults simply trump the
value of protecting children, or other citizens, from harm. Etzioni's
suggestion that liberalism inflates the value of individual free-speech
rights at the expense of protection of the welfare of children distorts
liberal principles.
We can see that a liberal conception of free-speech rights is more
subtle than Etzioni allows by examining some of its key features. The
account I articulate draws broadly on a vision of liberalism as an interpretation of the equal moral standing of persons of the sort associated with the work of contemporary theorists such as John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, and T.M. Scanlon, as well as, from an earlier tradition, the work of J.S. Mill. 4 The conception of the person that lies at
2. For some influential treatments of freedom of expression, see ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (Galaxy
Books 1965) (1948); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1986) (1859); JOHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 289 (1993); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
3. This tendency towards rhetorical excess about freedom of speech is exhibited in some
of the statements made by ACLU representatives discussed in Etzioni, supra note 1. Etzioni
claims that free speech absolutism has its roots in liberalism but he cites no contemporary liberal theorists who actually endorse this stance.
4. There is theoretical diversity within this broad liberal tradition. The character of utilitarian defenses of free speech is importantly different from those grounded in appeals to autonomy or justice, even if they converge on similar solutions to political or legal controversies. A
utilitarian defender of free expression might contend that First Amendment protections are
ultimately justified because they promote the overall well-being of the community. Mill claims
that his influential defense of free speech in ON LIBERTY is ultimately grounded in the principle
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the heart of this form of liberalism is crucial to understanding the
resources there are within liberalism to develop a theory of freedom
of expression that is sensitive to the interests of children. Etzioni
claims that "the reason liberals shy away from dealing with children
in political and social theory is that children threaten the very foundations on which their theory rests."5 An examination of the foundational commitments of contemporary liberalism calls this diagnosis
into question.
Liberalism is predicated upon a conception of moral personality
and an allied conception of fundamental equality. According to
Rawls,
[t]he basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the
powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected
with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to
fully cooperating members of
the requisite minimum degree
6 to be
society makes persons equal.
Conceiving of persons in this way does not, pace some communitarian
claims, imply that persons come to have their moral powers independently of their interaction with others in communities of shared
ideals or commitments.7 The attribution of moral powers to persons
does not rest upon or reflect an atomistic conception of the self in
which individuals are unencumbered by particular religious, cultural,
familial, or philosophical commitments. Children and adults are influenced and shaped by their particular social and cultural contexts in a
variety of profound ways. Various facets of our identity are determined by the particular communities in which we live and grow up.
Indeed, as Rawls notes, the very acquisition of moral powers depends
of utility. See MILL, supra note 2. A Kantian defender of the same rights might claim that First
Amendment protections are grounded in considerations of respect for autonomy. See Scanlon,
supra note 2.
5. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 49.
6. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 19. Rawls relies on this conception of the person in developing
his account of the basic liberties and their priority that employs the original position. Id. at 289371. Development of the implications of this conception of the person for our understanding of
the nature and importance of certain liberties can proceed without reliance on the original
position. See JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality (1975), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 254 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
7. For influential statements of the communitarian critique of the liberal conception of
the self, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 59-65 (1982);

Charles Taylor, Atomism, in POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM 39 (Alkis Kontos ed.,
1979); Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL.
THEORY 81 (1984). Will Kymiicka's response to communitarian critiques of the liberal self in
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 47-70, 237-42 (1989) effectively explains why liberals are not committed to an asocial conception of the self.
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crucially on the nurturing activities of parents, families, and communities. 8 But on the liberal view, the fact that our commitments, convictions, and personality are shaped by unchosen social and cultural
influences does not necessarily preclude the possibility of deliberation
about, and even revision of, basic commitments. We can raise children to become reflective, autonomous persons. On a liberal view,
children have a right to an upbringing that facilitates full development
of the moral powers. The value of freedom of expression in general
and its significance for children must be understood against this background.
Persons have a fundamental interest in ensuring that the political
community to which they belong gives adequate and reliable protection to the conditions under which their moral powers can be developed and meaningfully exercised. For autonomous adults, freedom of
expression is principally important in relation to the exercise of moral
powers. For children, as potentially autonomous agents, the importance of freedom of expression is related to both the development
and the exercise of the moral powers. Our focus is on children, but
examining the relation between freedom of expression and the exercise of the moral powers in the case of adults provides a context for
considering the stake children have in developing and exercising the
moral powers. Consider the connection between the first moral power
and freedom of expression. Each person has a conception of the good
that they will seek to pursue. The successful pursuit of a conception of
the good will typically depend on being able to express publicly, in
both one's opinions and activities, the ideals that one has embraced
and that confer value on one's life. For example, a Christian may wish
to communicate her views about the value of her religious commitments to others in the hope of convincing others to adopt her faith.
She will want to have access to the views and practices of other Christians, both so she can join in shared worship and so she can better
understand what her Christian commitments require of her. Freedom
of expression thus plays an important role in facilitating each person's
conception of the good. However, it is also a crucial feature of the
liberal conception of the person that our convictions about what constitutes a good life are fallible. A person may come to realize that the
conception of the good she currently adopts stands in need of significant revision. She may even come to believe that she should reject her

8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 462-79 (1971).

2004] A LIBERAL THEORY OFFREEDOM OFEXPRESSION FOR CHILDREN

61

current conception and embrace a radically different set of convictions. She may abandon her faith and become an atheist.
The recognition that our convictions about the good are fallible
does not imply either that we cannot determine how best we should
lead our lives or that we cannot pursue our convictions in ways that
display a depth of commitment. However, it does suggest that we
have a substantial interest in being able to deliberate about the nature
and value of our basic commitments. Liberals contend that deliberation can be facilitated and enhanced both by being free to express our
convictions to others and by having access to and being exposed to
other perspectives or conceptions of the good, along with the opportunity to explore different possibilities. The interest in implementing
and deliberating about our conception of the good provides a basis
for prizing a culture that presents to its citizens a wide variety of opportunities to explore and pursue different conceptions of the goodand ensures them access to a rich repertoire of resources for deliberation about various matters. Even in the case of adults, we can see that
the fact that humans are subject to external influences is assumed
rather than denied by liberal social theory.
When we consider the second moral power that Rawls attributes
to persons-the capacity for a sense of justice-there are parallel reasons for attributing significant value to the protection of freedom of
expression. In a political community, particularly a democracy, citizens with an effective sense of justice will be concerned with ensuring
that basic social institutions are just and that policies pursued by government on behalf of the people are commensurate with justice. Citizens will thus have an important interest in being able to express their
convictions about justice to others. They will also have an interest in
engaging in deliberation not only about the merits of legislation and
proposed government activity, but also about their understanding of
the principles of justice that ought to shape basic structures of society.
Freedom of expression permits the dissemination of information relevant to deliberation, is intimately linked to political participation, and
facilitates deliberation about justice. 9
The often-cited claim that freedom of expression contributes to
the discovery of truth complements the foregoing considerations.
Frederick Schauer offers a useful summary of this view and its appeal:
Open discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of enquiry, and
freedom to criticize, so the argument goes, are necessary conditions
9. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2, at 115-124.
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for the effective functioning of the process of searching for truth.
Without this freedom we are said to be destined to stumble blindly
between truth and falsehood. With it we can identify truth and reject falsity in any area of human enquiry. 0
Mill and other proponents of this argument may have been unduly
optimistic about the inevitable tendency of truth to win acceptance
over falsity or for reasonable doctrines to prevail over unreasonable
ones. In some contexts, it is arguable that permitting some forms of
speech actually inhibits the effective pursuit of truth. For instance,
hate speech that advances demonstrably false, inflammatory, and
hurtful claims may divert attention from areas of enquiry in which
knowledge can be advanced.11 We may simply waste time refuting the
demonstrably false claims of Holocaust deniers and the like. Similarly, the presence of racist invective in educational settings may impede the ability of students to learn.'" But the importance of free
speech to the discovery of truth can be defended even it is not true
that unfettered freedom of expression is always maximally conducive
to the discovery of truth. The presumptive value of free expression
depends only on the general tendency for freedom of expression to
advance the aim of providing citizens with helpful and reliable information.
We have seen that free and equal persons have deliberative, expressive, and informational interests that are well served by freedom
of expression. 3 To the degree that circumstances can be identified in
which freedom of expression frustrates these interests, there are
grounds to regulate expression so as to better advance these aims. At
this juncture, however, liberals express skepticism about the capacity
of the state to make appropriate distinctions about the kinds of expression that merit protection and those that can be restricted or
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 15.
11. Criminal sanctions for certain forms of hate speech have been deemed constitutionally
valid by the Canadian Supreme Court. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699.
12. In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 830-31, the
Canadian Supreme Court accepted the claim of a Human Rights Board of Inquiry that the
notoriety of a teacher's off duty anti-Semitic publications contributed to a "'poisoned' educational environment" even when there was no evidence that the teacher expressed his views in
the classroom. I shall not address controversies concerning the appropriateness of college
speech codes aimed at ensuring a non-discriminatory learning environment.
13. Joshua Cohen distinguishes and discusses these interests in Freedom of Expression, in
TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 173, 184-89 (David Heyd ed., 1996). T.M. Scanlon, Jr.
makes a different but complementary distinction between kinds of interests. See T.M. Scanlon,
Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP
139 (David Copp & Susan Wendell eds., 1983). Scanlon distinguishes participant interests,
audience interests, and bystander interests. See id. at 140-47.
10.
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regulated. There are at least two sorts of concern. First, liberals worry
about the motives that governments have for restricting free expression. A government may seek to silence critics in order to retain
power, or it may be motivated to curry favor with powerful segments
of the population to implement intolerant policies that unfairly deprive unpopular minority groups (whether religious, cultural, racial,
sexual, or linguistic) of opportunities to pursue and express their ideals (e.g., by targeting gay and lesbian erotica for censorship). Second,
even where state action is not directed by illiberal motivations, state
officials face enormous practical difficulties in trying to discriminate
reliably between forms of expression that merit protection and those
that are either valueless or harmful. For instance, hate speech and
certain forms of pornography probably tend to frustrate rather than
facilitate the exercise and development of moral powers. As such,
these forms of speech do not merit special protection. However, it
may be next to impossible for state officials to distinguish genuinely
objectionable material from material that contributes positively, or at
least not adversely, to the realization of our moral powers. In an
important range of'cases, even well-intentioned state bureaucracies
lack reliable means to determine which forms of expression merit
protection and which do not. Extensive freedom of expression is
presumptively valuable on this score not because it always or
necessarily contributes to maximal truth discovery, the effective
dissemination of information, or deliberation. But more highly
regulative approaches to freedom of expression tend to serve these
values less well than minimally regulative approaches. Ensuring that a
high threshold of justification must be met before content regulations
can be applied is one important way to guard against both the corrupt
use of state power and the inevitable errors that even wellintentioned state agencies will make.
II. COSTS

OF EXPRESSION AND LEGITIMATE GROUNDS FOR
REGULATION

We have seen that liberalism locates the justification of freespeech rights in claims about how the fundamental interests of persons are served by freedom of expression. However, as some points
already raised suggest, unregulated freedom of expression can have
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serious costs for free and equal persons. 14 As Joshua Cohen notes,
freedom of expression
is sometimes offensive, disgusting, or outrageous; it produces reputational injury and emotional distress; it requires protection from
hecklers; when it is delivered though leaflets, someone has to clean
up the mess; and, concentrated in sufficient numbers on billboards,
telephone poles, and15 buses, it can add to the general ugliness of an
urban environment.

The challenge is to devise principled and practically feasible
strategies that permit, insofar as possible, reasonable forms of mutual
accommodation of the divergent interests affected by free expression,
both positively and negatively. I will not offer a comprehensive analysis of the interests of adults that can be damaged by expression. It
suffices to note that adults have interests in not being offended, insulted, confused, mislead, emotionally injured, physically injured, or
financially disadvantaged by expression or the predictable effects of
expression.1 6 Children have parallel interests, but the character of
their interests is, in some respects, more complex.
The liberal way of dealing with the costs of speech has four elements. First, different categories of expression are distinguished with
respect to the importance of the interests generally served by them. 7
Expression concerning political, religious, moral, artistic, literary, and
academic matters is typically placed in a category of specially protected expression. Protecting expression in these areas seems more
closely related to the exercise of our basic moral powers and advancing our deliberative, expressive, and informational interests than protection of commercial speech. The categorization of kinds of
expression relative to interests provides a partial basis for determining when regulation of the content of expression is legitimate. The
threshold of justification that must be met for regulating the content
of expression is higher for some categories of expression than it is for
14. Some free expression absolutists may be tempted by the idea that expression, as opposed to action, is not itself costly and thereby cannot be limited on the grounds of its costs. The
position, dubbed "minimalism" by Cohen, is discussed and effectively refuted by him in Freedom of Expression, supra note 13, at 180-82.
15. Id. at 178.
16. Some expression, such as offensive speech, is directly costly. The mere fact that I hear
someone tell a racist joke causes me to be offended. Some expression, such as incitement to
violence, is indirectly costly. In this sort of case, the expression causes behavior-e.g., an assault-that would not have occurred were it not for the incitement. Advertising can be indirectly costly in a similar way. A business may suffer a loss of revenue when consumers learn via
advertising that a competing business offers the same products at a better price.
17. Both Scanlon, supra note 13, at 154-57, and Cohen, supra note 13, at 177-80, defend
this approach.
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other, less important, categories of expression. For example, because
the interests served by commercial speech are less fundamental than
those served by political speech, and because it is easier to identify
uncontroversial standards of truth concerning claims made about
products than about political positions, regulations of the content of
commercial speech-e.g., laws requiring truth in advertising-can be
easily justified, whereas content regulation of political speech is
rarely, if ever, justified. 8
Second, various time, manner, and place regulations of expression are helpful in mitigating some costs of expression without substantially diminishing the expressive, deliberative, and informational
value of freedom of expression. Third, some of the costs generated by
free expression can be reduced by encouraging and facilitating more
expression. The "more speech"' 19 strategy aims at giving those adversely affected by protected forms of expression an opportunity to
mitigate the damaging effects of expression-e.g., the tendency of
people to form false beliefs about, or hostile attitudes towards, an
individual or group-by using expression to challenge and thereby
dilute the effects of damaging expression. Fourth, efforts can also be
undertaken to ensure that individuals and groups have fair and adequate access to freedom of expression. For example, in order to limit
the degree to which political discourse is excessively dominated by
wealthy and powerful groups, the state may undertake to provide
free-time political advertising.
III. EXTENDING THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION TO CHILDREN

I have identified some of the main resources available in contemporary liberal theory for dealing with First Amendment issues.2 0
18. There are, of course, difficult cases. Some hate speech clearly falls into the category of
political speech and thus might seem to be immune from content based regulation. However,
since the potential harm from hate speech is significant and since the claims advanced by some
hate mongers are often demonstrably false, some content regulation of hate speech might, in
principle, be consistent with liberal principles. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699-701
(Can.).
19. Cohen, supra note 13, at 201. Cohen notes that this "more speech" strategy was articulated in Brandeis's opinion in Whitney v. California,274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
20. I assume that a philosophical account of freedom of expression can play an important
role in the interpretation of constitutional guarantees of rights, such as the protection of free
speech given in the First Amendment. However, I do not assume that a sound theory of freedom of expression necessarily exclusively determines the best interpretation of such a provision
in the American Constitution or other constitutions. The connection between constitutional
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The analysis shows that liberal theory is more nuanced than Etzioni's

diagnosis of the limits of liberalism suggests. Liberals recognize limits
to freedom of expression, and they gauge these limits via an interpretation of the interests of free and equal persons. However, even on
the account sketched above, one can see the basis for the charge that
the liberal conception is insensitive to the needs of children. The liberal conception is silent on two important issues. The first can be labeled the "protection of minors" issue. It concerns the degree to
which children have a claim to be insulated from exposure to forms of

expression to which adults are permitted access but that may be unsuitable for children. Etzioni's communitarian analysis is mainly focused on this issue. He emphasizes the importance of protecting
children from harmful cultural materials. By contrast, I argue that
liberals should conceive of the protection issue in broader terms. Protecting children from harm is obviously important, but children can

also be insulated from exposure to certain materials that are not
harmful but are nonetheless unsuitable for them. The protection issue
involves determining the criteria that should be employed in determining what forms of expression children should be shielded from.
The harm-focused analysis provided by Etzioni is helpful but limited.
A liberal framework can explain why the avoidance of harm is not the
only focus of concern in resolving the protection issue. Or so I shall

argue.
The second issue on which liberal theories of freedom expression
have been largely silent concerns the claim children have to rights of
free expression. I will label this the "expression of minors" issue. For

the most part, Etzioni sets this issue aside. He seems reticent about
attributing significant free-speech rights to children. From a commuinterpretation and normative political theory depends on the theory of constitutional interpretation one adopts. Even on theories of constitutional interpretation in which sound legal reasoning is directly linked to considerations of justice not explicitly stated in legal documents, it is
possible that the best interpretation of meaning of the First Amendment with respect to a particular legal controversy may diverge from the solution to the controversy that is recommended
by a philosophical theory of freedom of expression. It could be true, for instance, that justice
permits comprehensive bans on advertising aimed at children under thirteen, but that such a
ban lacks adequate justification in First Amendment jurisprudence in light of earlier decisions
regarding the government's right to regulate commercial speech. (Quebec imposes such a ban
and the Canadian Supreme court has upheld its constitutionality. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 933.) It is not analytic, in other words, that protections
of free speech given in any particular constitution are to be understood as equivalent to the best
philosophical understanding of the nature and limits of free speech. Although I think the proposals I make about the liberal theory of freedom of expression are relevant to First Amendment jurisprudence, I shall not present an expressly constitutional argument concerning the
correct interpretation of the First Amendment or other facets of the American Constitution.
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nitarian perspective that emphasizes the dissimilarities between
adults and children by focusing mainly on the special vulnerabilities
of children, inattention to the expression issue is unsurprising. From a
liberal point of view, however, the free-speech rights of children cannot be treated so lightly. As children mature and start to acquire
moral powers, they have increasingly weighty interests in having access to the speech and expression of others-both of other children
and of adults. Without some such access, the development of the
moral powers can be inhibited. Similarly, children develop interests in
being able to express their views to others. Liberals think that children can display a greater degree of moral agency and independence
than communitarians are prepared to acknowledge."' As beings with
active but immature moral powers, children qua children have at least
some rights of freedom of expression, and the scope and importance
of these rights increase as children mature. The existence of such
rights can affect the degree to which parents, other adults (e.g., school
authorities acting on behalf of parents), or the state can legitimately
exercise authority over children in determining the materials that
children should be permitted to access and the expressive activities
that they should be permitted to engage in (e.g., having access to information about sexuality or engaging in political protests at high
schools"). The expression issue has two dimensions. First, what criteria should determine the expressive material children have a right to
access? Second, what criteria should determine the kinds of expressive activities children have a right to engage in?
Two dimensions of a satisfactory response to the protection and
expression issues are worth noting. First, the criteria regulating protection and expression must be sensitive to relevant differences in
how these issues are resolved for children of different ages and maturity. As children develop cognitive, emotional, and moral capacities,
the range of material from which they need to be protected diminishes. Similarly, as children mature, the scope and content of their

21. Joe Coleman reviews some recent work in developmental psychology that suggests that
the differences between the moral capacities of adults and young teenagers is not as great as is
often assumed. See Joe Coleman, Answering Susan: Liberalism, Civic Education,and the Status
of Younger Persons, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 160 (David Archard & Colin M. Macleod eds., 2002).
22. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (policy
prohibiting students from wearing black armbands to protest the hostilities in Vietnam held to
be an unconstitutional infringement of students' right of expression).
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rights 23 to expression increase. We can meaningfully ascribe rights of
free expression to children without supposing either that all children,
irrespective of age or maturity, have the same rights, or that the content of their rights cannot be differentiated from the content of the
rights of adults. Etzioni accepts the general point that children are
evolving beings. He suggests that minors can be divided into two
categories: children and teenagers. I argue that further distinctions
between children at different stages of development are needed in
order to track more accurately different degrees of moral maturity
and their relation to children's interests in having access to some expressive materials. Second, the scope and character of both adults'
rights to freedom of expression and those of children will depend on a
consideration of the interaction between the interests of children and
adults. The extent to which adults may engage in some forms of expressive activity may be limited by effects of expressive activity on
children. We cannot determine the actual content of adult rights
without considering the distinct and independent interests of children.
I shall call this the "intersection issue."
IV. INTERPRETING THE EVOLVING INTERESTS OF CHILDREN

The point of departure for the liberal theory of expression is the
Rawlsian conception of persons as free and equal. Children, especially young children, are not free and equal in the Rawlsian sense
because they lack full possession of the relevant moral powers. Children do.not have a developed sense of justice or a mature capacity for
a conception of the good. Moreover, they do not have a determinate
conception of the good. This does not imply that children are not entitled to equal consideration as independent persons. But extending
the principle to children requires recognition that children are, in
Robert Noggle's phrase, "special agents," and as such are subject to
various kinds of adult authority. 24 So we cannot argue that a liberal
conception of freedom of expression serves the moral powers of chil-

23. For a discussion of the attribution of rights to children, see Samantha Brennan, Children's Choices or Children's Interests: Which Do Their Rights Protect?, in THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 21, at 53; Harry Brighouse, What Rights (if Any)

Do Children Have?, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF
31; James Griffin, Do Children Have Rights?, in THE MORAL

CHILDREN, supra note 21, at
AND POLITICAL STATUS OF

CHILDREN, supra note 21, at 19. I am assuming that children can at least be assigned legal

rights.
24. Robert Noggle, Special Agents: Children's Autonomy and ParentalAuthority, in THE
MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 21, at 97, 101.
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dren in just the way it serves the moral powers of adults. Indeed, very
young children in virtue of their cognitive, emotional, and moral immaturity seem to have virtually no direct expressive, deliberative, or
informational interests that are served by freedom of expression. By
the same token, freedom of expression poses virtually no direct costs
for very young children. An infant cannot be misled, offended, confused, emotionally wounded, etc, by exposure to expression with a
particular content precisely because she cannot comprehend the content of the material. The potential benefits and costs of freedom of
expression for children emerge as children develop. The cognitive,
moral, and emotional immaturity of children can render them especially vulnerable to some forms of expression that they are ill
equipped to protect themselves from. They depend on others to advance their crucial interests and protect them from harm.2 5
Nonetheless, freedom of expression issues involving children can
be resolved in a way that is structurally parallel to the liberal account
of freedom of expression concerning adults. We begin by considering
how the immaturity of moral powers of children and their consequent
vulnerability and dependency affects the special character of children's interests in relation to freedom of expression. But we also consider how the gradual development of children's independent moral
personalities can be facilitated by freedom of expression. This marks
an important contrast in the liberal and communitarian analyses.
Etzioni tends to treat children as fairly passive beings who are extremely vulnerable to the consumption of harmful speech that is directed their way. Liberals, I contend, see children as agents in the
process of development who have special vulnerabilities, including
ones not noted by Etzioni, but who have claims to have their moral
powers developed and, to the degree the powers are realized, respected. The special attention given to the development of moral personality can deepen our understanding of the costs and benefits of
freedom of expression for children. We can then draw on the fourpart strategy favored by liberals for identifying reasonable strategies
for mitigating the costs of expression.

25. This is not to imply that adults are not, in important respects, dependent on others for
protection of their basic interests. But the character of child dependency on adults is importantly different than the character of an adult's dependency on others. The dependency of
children is typically more extensive and is rooted in their developmental immaturity.
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Developmental Interests-MoralPowers and Welfare

If children are to become the sort of beings for whom full rights
of free expression are valuable, then the moral capacities on which
the value of these rights depends must be suitably nurtured and developed. From a liberal point of view, the development of the basic
moral powers is of preeminent importance. Special weight should be
placed on ensuring that the exposure of children to expression does
not encumber the development of a sense of justice or their capacity
to deliberate and pursue a conception of the good. The concern with
the development of moral powers has a self-regarding and an otherregarding aspect. We want children to blossom into reason-sensitive
beings who are capable of living meaningful and successful lives. But
we also want children to become persons who can recognize and respond to the legitimate moral claims of others. Exposing children to
graphically violent or hateful material may dull their sensitivity to the
moral claims of others and encourage anti-social attitudes. The studies cited by Etzioni concerning the effects of exposure to televised
violence on children's levels of aggression are disturbing from this
perspective. They suggest televised violence can impede the development of a robust sense of justice. But exposing children to a steady
diet of mindless television can be objectionable even if it does not
impair children's sense of justice. It can be objectionable on the
grounds that it diminishes their capacity for imaginative reflection on
the projects and challenges that might be worth pursuing. Liberals
should be concerned with ensuring that children have access to a diverse range of cultural materials that can contribute to the cultivation
of deliberative capacities and can stimulate critical reflection on a
range of options. From the point of view of developing moral personality, merely blocking children's access to harmful materials is myopic.
Provision of the conditions under which the two moral powers
can be developed is especially important, but children have other
developmental interests that merit recognition. Children have crucial
welfare interests that can affect matters of freedom of expression.
Most obviously, children have a special interest in physical and mental health. Importance naturally attaches to ensuring that children
develop good eating habits and that they do not develop addictions to
tobacco, drugs, or alcohol. If, as seems to be the case, young children
are gullible, impressionable, and unable to defer gratification of their
desires effectively, then we have reason to be concerned with material
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(e.g., tobacco or fast food advertising) that tends to cultivate in children unhealthy habits or damaging desires. 26 Concern for ensuring the
development of moral powers and concern for the more familiar welfare interests of children provides a primafacie basis on which to restrict the sort of access that minors can have to various forms of
expression. The focus on protecting developmental interests is, I
think, a plausible way of capturing and elucidating the general concern for protecting children from harm. However, especially as they
mature, developmental interests, particularly those associated with
the moral powers, can be served by access to a greater range of expressive materials. One way in which development of moral powers
takes place is through experimental exercise of the powers. Children
gradually acquire informational, deliberative, and expressive interests
that are structurally parallel to those of adults. They have an interest
in reflecting on the options open to them and exchanging their opinions on an increasingly wide range of subjects, including moral and
political matters, with others. This suggests that developmental interests can be appealed to not only in the justification of insulating children from some materials, but also in the justification of ensuring that
children have access to expressive materials and that they are permitted to engage in expressive activities.
B.

Quality of Childhood Life Interests

Developmental interests emphasize the sorts of beings children
will become, and thus they are future-oriented. We seek to equip
children with the habits and capacities for reflective deliberation and
self-direction that will permit them to live successful and responsible
adult lives. However, we should also display concern for the interests
children have as children in living rich and rewarding lives. This point
relates not so much to the expressive, deliberative, or informational
interests of children, but rather to the degree that exposure to materials can either enhance or diminish the quality of the experience of
childhood per se. Here, too, there are reasons both to insulate children from material and to ensure that they have access to material.
Having access to a wide variety of books, movies, music, and television can enrich the quality of a child's childhood. But materials are
only likely to enhance the experience of childhood to the degree that
26. In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 933-34, the Canadian Supreme Court was influenced by evidence that children under thirteen are especially
vulnerable to manipulation through advertising.
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they are "age appropriate"-that is, to the degree the subject matter
and modes of presentation are ones children can relate to in a suitable
fashion. The acquisition of moral personality is not facilitated by presenting children with a wide array of options to examine if they lack
the cognitive or emotional maturity even to grasp the options presented to them. Yet such exposure need not hinder moral development for it to be objectionable. Expressive materials with "mature"
themes can be unsuitable for children on other grounds.
The general point is that protecting children from harm is not all
that matters. Some material may be unsuitable for children because it
is unsettling. Material can be unsettling but nonharmful in a number
of ways. It can be confusing, frightening, or embarrassing, or it can be
apt to elicit from children inappropriate responses. The distinction
between harmful and unsettling material draws on a distinction made
between harm and unhappy states of mind.27 Persons are harmed
when they suffer a setback to a basic welfare or developmental interest. But there are various unpleasant or disliked states of mind that
we have reason to avoid that do not constitute a setback in our interests. Nonharmful but objectionable states of mind include "unpleasant sensations (evil smells, grating noises), transitory disappointments
and disillusionments, wounded pride, hurt feelings, aroused anger,
shocked sensibility, alarm, disgust, frustration, impatient restlessness,
acute boredom, irritation, embarrassment, feelings of guilt and
shame, physical pain (at a readily tolerable level), bodily discomfort,
and many more. z'2 Children can experience some of these unpleasant
states of mind, and such experiences can diminish their childhood
experience. Because we must show concern for the quality of the experience of childhood, we have reason to insulate children from unsettling expressive materials even if exposure does not result in
significant harm.
Suppose, for instance, that it was determined that exposing
young children to movies depicting explicit sexual activity between
consenting adults had no harmful effects on children. That is, it had
no discernible lasting effects on attitudes to sexuality or sexual behavior, and it did not impede the development of a healthy self-image of
oneself as a sexual being, etc. We can still object that it is not appropriate to expose young children to such materials because children
27. Joel Feinberg distinguishes two kinds of unhappy states of mind: offenses and hurts. See
1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 45-47 (1984).
28. Id. at 45.
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lack the emotional and cognitive maturity to grasp fully the nature of
the activities depicted or to appreciate their social and cultural meaning. We do not augment the quality of children's lives by exposing
them to materials that they cannot grasp, but which nonetheless elicit
strong unsettling responses from them. Graphic displays of explicit
sex may elicit confusion, embarrassment, or even titillation of a sort
that can diminish the sense of innocence that is an important aspect of
a good childhood. Similarly, it can be appropriate to shield young
children from frightening films or even news reports of war, crime, or
natural disasters on the grounds that such material will unnecessarily
upset or confuse children. The force of this sort of justification for
limiting children's access to expressive materials diminishes as children acquire the capacities that permit them to understand and successfully negotiate unsettling material. And it is not reasonable to
expect that children can always be fully insulated from unsettling material. Indeed, at certain points in their lives, the welfare and developmental interests of children will be served by giving them access to
unsettling material. A possible example is sex education. Young teenagers may be embarrassed by certain educational materials, but this
will not be sufficient reason to avoid use of such materials for legitimate educational purposes. The main point is that we have reason to
insulate children from unsettling material even if exposure to the material does not pose risks of long-term harm or does threaten to impede proper moral development.
C. GuardianInterests
Since children lack a determinate and stable conception of the
good of their own making, the direction of children's lives initially
depends crucially on the judgments made by their guardians, usually
their parents. Parents have a special responsibility to nurture their
children and advance their children's interests. In discharging this
responsibility, parents typically enjoy wide-ranging discretion in shaping certain features of their children's upbringing. In particular, parents have special prerogatives to raise children in ways compatible
with their conception of the good. Religious parents will want their
children to participate in distinctive religious practices and will attempt to transmit their religious convictions to their children. The
justification of such parental authority is rooted partly in the concern
to advance the interests of children and partly in the independent
claims parents have to implement their own conception of the good.
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On a liberal view, parental authority to transmit a conception of the
good to their children is limited in various ways. Parents cannot try to
indoctrinate their children by denying them access to primary or secondary education. Nor can parents seek to subvert or circumscribe
the development of the autonomy of children in other ways. Many
controversies involving children turn on disputes about the nature
and extent of parental authority over children. I have argued elsewhere that parents have the prerogative to provisionally privilege a
particular conception of the good, but that they cannot seek to authoritatively fix their children's ends.2 9 Determining the precise
boundaries of parental authority is an important issue. But for the
purposes of this discussion we need not determine just what these
boundaries are. Instead, we can proceed on the assumption that
guardians have a legitimate interest in shaping and controlling some
important aspects of the "ethical" and cultural environment in which
children are raised. In pursuing this interest, guardians have some
claim to regulate the kinds of expressive materials to which children
have access. The important point here is that the stake parents have
in regulating access is not limited to shielding children from materials
that are deemed to be harmful. To some degree, parents have a claim
to limit access to materials that are inconsistent with or offensive to
the conception of the good they seek to present to their children.
Consider parental views of profanity. Parents who are offended
by profanity or who believe, in virtue of their religious convictions,
that children ought not to be exposed to profanity have a stake in
ensuring that their children are not exposed to it. The stake that parents have here in shielding their children from profanity is not dependent on establishing that profanity is harmful to children, or even
that it is unsettling to children. Instead, parents can claim that exposing children to profanity is offensive to parental sensibilities. Guardian interests of the sort described here are related to, but not entirely
equivalent to, the interests of children. They are initially grounded in
the interests that guardians of children have in pursuing a conception
of the good, but insofar as children participate in the conception of
the good favored by parents, they also become part of children's interests. Children have an interest in living a life that is guided by some

29. There are a variety of views about the nature and extent of parental authority. See
Colin M. Macleod, Conceptions of ParentalAutonomy, 25 POL. & SOC'Y 117 (1997), for development of the idea of "provisional privileging" and a critical review of competing views of the
extent of parental authority.
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determinate conception of the good. By respecting, at least to some
degree, the conception of the good that parents extend to their children, we thereby manifest respect for the children's interest in having
a life that is shaped by a conception of the good.
Liberals accept that guardian interests have some role to play in
resolving issues concerning freedom of expression and children. Parents cannot, however, exercise the prerogatives of parental authority
to block access to expressive materials in ways that impede the development of children's moral powers. Parents may hope that children
will come, in maturity, to embrace the values and commitments of
their parents. But parents must recognize the ultimate independence
of their children as separate persons who have the right to decide for
themselves what commitments to embrace and what projects are
worth pursuing. Parents may legitimately make special efforts in their
nurturing activities to privilege their own distinctive conceptions of
the good. They may include children in distinctive religious and cultural practices, and they may provide special instruction about the
teachings of a particular faith or way of life. But they should not seek
to advance their conceptions of the good by foreclosing opportunities
for informed deliberation about different conceptions of the good.
Children, even at a fairly young age, should be made aware that there
is a plurality of conceptions of the good, and they should have access
to education and educational resources (e.g., libraries and museums)
that allow them to learn about and contemplate other conceptions of
the good. This does not mean that parents cannot control and monitor the expressive materials children access and seek to access. Parents have greater authority over young children to control and
monitor the consumption of expressive materials than they do over
teenagers. However, the degree of permissible control and monitoring is ultimately limited by respect for the emerging moral personality
of children. Parental authority gradually gives way to the emergence
of children's autonomy and their development of independent deliberative and informational interests. The emerging moral powers of
children are, on the liberal view, accompanied by increased moral
independence from the authority of parents. The efforts that parents
may undertake to transmit distinctive values or commitments to their
children are tempered by the moral independence of children. So
although children are, to a degree, ingredients in their parents' life
plans, they cannot merely be used as a means for the realization of
parental ideals. On the liberal view, children must be schooled in
autonomy, and the state has an important role in ensuring that the
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social conditions for the development of autonomy are secured for all
children. In the context of freedom of expression, this means that
children have a right to access age-appropriate information 30 about
conceptions of the good that are different from and even opposed to
the conception of the good embraced by parents.
Disputes between liberals and communitarians concerning the
extent of parental autonomy often turn on two distinct issues. The
first concerns the value of autonomy per se. Some communitarians
deny that children have a right to full development of the moral powers.31 The second concerns the social conditions of autonomy. Here
the issue is whether development of the moral powers requires, as I
have insisted, providing children with access to a wide plurality of
32
deliberative resources.
V.

BALANCING THE DISTINCTIVE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN

So far we have seen how a liberal conception of moral personality can affect our understanding of the interests of children. We now
consider how these interests can be balanced. We seek balance along
three interconnected dimensions. First, we want to determine what
sort of balance between access to expressive materials and insulation
from expressive materials appropriately accommodates developmental, quality of childhood life, and guardian interests. Second, we need
an account of this balancing that is responsive to the evolving character of children's interests and capacities. Third, we need to explain
how the freedom of expression claims of children intersect with those
of adults.
The sort of balance between access and insulation that serves developmental interests, quality of life interests, and guardian interests
will vary with different stages in childhood. The child-teenager distinction proposed by Etzioni provides a useful starting place, but it is
arguably insensitive to developmental differences in the deliberative,
expressive, and informational interests of children. Instead I propose
30. By age-appropriate, I mean information that is expressed in forms that children can
understand, given their stage of development, and that is presented in ways that are not needlessly unsettling.
31. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 129-31 (1991), for a skeptical view of the value of liberal autonomy.
32. For a more detailed discussion of the social conditions of autonomy, see generally
Eamonn Callan, Autonomy, Child-Rearing and Good Lives, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL
STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 21, at 118; EMILY R. GILL, BECOMING FREE: AUTONOMY

AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL POLITY (2001); Macleod, supra note 29, at 131-33.
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that we distinguish at least five stages of childhood: infanqy (0-3
years), preschool (3-6 years), a juvenile stage (6-12 years), adolescence (13-15 years), and young adulthood (15-18 years).33 We can
anticipate that as children move through these stages their deliberative, informational, and expressive interests expand and become
weightier such that the range of expressive materials to which they
must be permitted access increases and the manner in which they
have access is less subject to monitoring and content regulation by
adults in positions of authority. At later stages of childhood, development interests are likely to be well served by permitting (and indeed encouraging) children to access an increasingly wide range of
expressive materials, even ones that may not meet with parental approval. Development of deliberative capacities can be enhanced by
the challenge of sorting through a plurality of perspectives that require children to exercise a degree of independent judgment about
the value of different ideas, activities, and forms of life. Similarly, as
children mature, they become increasingly able to determine for
themselves what expressive materials and activities are likely to contribute to the quality of their lives. So the need for adult control over
the expressive materials to which children have access declines. Nonetheless, before full maturity, parents retain, partly in virtue of their
guardian interests, some degree of control and influence over the sort
of materials children can access. In early stages, the degree of control
is high, but it diminishes as children become independent and able to
direct their own lives. For example, parents might initially enjoy almost complete authority to determine the form and content of the
material to which children have access. But as children become young
adults, parental prerogatives consist primarily in limited forms of
monitoring of the kinds of materials accessed by children. In a similar
way, the range of expressive activities in which children are entitled to
participate also gradually increases, and the degree of adult control
over such matters gradually decreases.
The expectation that increased maturity should be accompanied
by increased expressive autonomy is predicated on two provisional
assumptions. First, it is assumed that younger, less mature children
are usually especially vulnerable to the potentially damaging effects
of exposure to expression. They tend to need more protections from
expression, and they tend to have weaker interests in having access to
33. I readily admit that this is a provisional proposal. It might need to be refined or modified in light of findings in developmental moral psychology.
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expressive materials. Second, I assume that advancing developmental
interests has priority over advancing quality of childhood life interests
and guardian interests. In effect, it is more important that expression
be regulated in ways commensurate with the development of children's moral powers and realization of their basic welfare than it be
regulated in ways that makes their childhood pleasant or facilitates
the realization of guardian interests. Of course, often there will be
harmony between these interests. However, tensions between the
interests concerning freedom of expression can arise. For example,
religious parents may wish to restrict the access that their teenager
has to material that questions the authority or veracity of tenets of the
family's religion. Preventing access to such material may advance
guardian interests, but it would impair developmental interests. I assume that in such cases developmental interests trump guardian interests. This assumption is a natural extension of liberal emphasis on
the development of free and equal persons.
I have already given some indication of the sort of guidance liberalism provides with respect to the protection of minors and expression of minors issues. But a few additional remarks are in order. First,
it should be clear that the high presumptive value of freedom of
speech for adults cannot be extended in any straightforward sense to
children. Especially in the case of younger children, it is often relatively easy to meet the threshold for regulating the content of expression. Restricting the access that young children have to violent,
sexually explicit, hateful expression, as well as manipulative advertising, is readily justified by appeal to the interests I have emphasized.
Exposure to these kinds of expression does not plausibly advance the
developmental interests of children, and it may even damage these
interests. Empirical studies of the sort reviewed by Etzioni that examine the potentially harmful effects of expression for children are thus
extremely important. But even if there is no conclusive empirical evidence establishing the harmful effects of exposing minors to such material, restricting access to such material can be justified by the appeal
to the quality of childhood and guardian interests. So in the case of
young children, content-based restrictions of expression can be justified without establishing that material with a particular content is
harmful to children. We need only show that it is likely to be unsettling (as opposed to harmful) to children or that it offends parental
conceptions of propriety.
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Matters change somewhat as children mature and the range of
expressive materials that might plausibly advance children's developmental interests widens considerably. At this stage, it becomes
harder for adult authorities to distinguish reliably between content
that is and is not appropriate for children to access. As children enter
adolescence, content-based regulations are harder to justify and also
hard to enforce feasibly. Nonetheless, even at this stage, some categories of expression are legitimately subject to more regulation than
others. Whereas adolescents arguably have a strong claim, grounded
in developmental interests, to unfettered access to educational resources concerning any subject matter, it is doubtful that they have a
claim to unfettered access to expressive materials that are primarily
commercial or erotic in nature. For example, whereas it is consistent
with liberal principles for the state to prohibit the sale of pornography
to minors, it is contrary to liberal principles to restrict a teenager's
access to educational materials about human sexuality. There are, of
course, important practical difficulties in classifying expressive materials and regulating the access that minors have to materials on the
basis of such classifications. But restricting access to material via this
kind of categorization is consistent with liberal principles.
The categories of expression that have special protection for
children parallel the categories given special protection for adults.
Political, religious, literary, intellectual, and artistic expression can
contribute to the development of children's moral powers, so expression in these categories merits special protection. The degree of protection these categories receive increases with the development of
children, and it is only with older children that these categories enjoy
the sort of status they are assigned in discussions of the free expression rights of adults. However, in these protected areas, older children have genuine rights to freedom of expression that are almost
indistinguishable from those of adults.
VI. INTERSECTION ISSUES

We have seen that liberal theory provides a nuanced and developmentally sensitive theory of freedom of expression for children.
Children's rights to freedom of expression are different from, and
more limited than, those of adults. Children have distinctive claims
both to protection from expression and to access to expression. The
question remains, however, whether it is possible to accommodate
children's claims without unduly encumbering the free expression
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rights that liberals traditionally assign to adults. Given that the rights
of freedom of expression of adults are more extensive than those of
children, are there feasible ways of ensuring that constraints on expression designed to protect children do not encumber the rights of
adults to freedom of expression?
The cases examined by Etzioni provide helpful examples of intersection challenges. His analysis points in the direction of solutions
to intersection issues that liberals should endorse. Indeed, the childadult separation approach defended by Etzioni in some of its forms is
quite consistent with the kind of time, manner, and place regulations
that liberals routinely accept as legitimate. Providing adults and children with different computer terminals to access the Internet does not
block adult access to protected speech, and it is hard to see how there
can be a principled objection to reliance on this strategy. Similarly,
judicious use of labeling, V-chip, and filtering technology should not
occasion alarm, nor should selective prohibitions on selling some expressive materials to minors. None of these strategies involve the content regulation that liberals are justifiably suspicious of, and none
significantly encumber the access that adults have to expressive materials. Indeed, from the vantage of the theory I have outlined, these
strategies can be defended even without appeal to evidence of the
harmful effects of cultural materials on children. Consider, for instance, the way in which labeling and V-chip technology can serve
both guardian and quality of childhood life interests. Labeling can
alert parents to material that might in their judgment be unsuitable
for young children-either because it is offensive to the values embraced by guardians or because it is likely to be unsettling. Even as
children mature and parental authority to determine access to content
diminishes, parents retain an interest in monitoring the materials consumed by their children. Labeling and software that tracks the web
activity of children can play a role in the legitimate monitoring of
children's activities.
There are some limitations and hazards with these ways of effecting child-adult separation. The schemes of classification upon which
filtering and labeling strategies depend are imperfect at best. Filtering
software is highly fallible and can be subverted by clever children or
adults determined to target children with objectionable material. The
costs generated by failures in these strategies are borne mainly by
children. They may be mistakenly exposed to objectionable material
or they may be wrongly denied access to material. But the main free
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speech interests of adults-either to have access to important expressive materials or to communicate expressive materials to a wide audience-are not imperiled. The fact that children's interests will, at
best, be imperfectly accommodated by child-adult separation strategies suggests supplementary strategies are likely to be necessary if the
freedom of expression interests of children are to be adequately
served.
Let me briefly mention two such strategies. First, it is inevitable
that children will be exposed to unsuitable or even harmful expressive
materials. One way to mitigate the costs of this kind of exposure is
through the "more speech" strategy. The idea here is to provide children with information and materials that help them to understand or
deal with objectionable material. For example, children, even quite
young children, can be alerted to ways in which advertising is manipulative or how exposure to depictions of graphic violence may lead to
anti-social attitudes. Proactive efforts to engage children in reasoning
about the content and possible effects of expressive material will not
always be successful. But they can contribute to the development of
moral powers and hence have much to recommend them from a liberal point of view. Second, it is likely that efforts to protect children
from speech will result in children being denied access to valuable
forms of expression. As I noted above, it is doubtful that state officials can reliably discriminate between material that is suitable for
children and material that is not. It seems appropriate, therefore, for
governments to ensure that children, especially adolescents and older
minors, have fairly unfettered and unmonitored access to a rich and
diverse repertoire of educational resources, including on potentially
controversial subjects (e.g., sexuality, religion, or politics). Respecting
the deliberative and informational interests of adolescents does not
require providing them access to any material of their choosing, but it
probably does require providing them access to information about
virtually any topic that they wish to explore. 34

34. The Supreme Court's ruling in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), is, from
this perspective, a step in the right direction. The Court held that school boards cannot use their
discretion to determine the content of their libraries in "a narrowly partisan or political manner." Id. at 870. Respecting the rights of expression of adolescents on my view also requires
ensuring that the holdings of school libraries are diverse and representative of a broad range of
views, even controversial ones.
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CONCLUSION

The variety of liberalism that I have drawn on retains a commitment to individualism and rights. But it does not deny that individuals
can be profoundly affected by expression. Rather, it supposes that
expression is important precisely because it can affect our beliefs,
attitudes, and conduct so dramatically. The effects of expression are
not always welcome and a decent theory should display appropriate
sensitivity to ways in which important interests can be frustrated by
free expression. Etionzi's communitarian analysis sensibly urges us to
pay attention to the possibility that speech can harm children. Liberalism is not hostile to this point. Indeed, the advantage of a liberal
theory of freedom of expression is that it provides a rich typology of
the range of children's interests that merit recognition when gauging
the costs and benefits of freedom of expression for children. A liberal
theory can guide us in determining the appropriate contours of various child-adult separation strategies, and it alerts us to the importance of respecting the emerging moral personalities of children.

